L INTRODUCTION
In order to analyse the place of information processing and communication in the modem computerized firm, the classical Theory of the Firm is reappraised considering that the activities of the firm are of two kinds:
-material processing» -data processing. Hère the focus is over the managerial organization of the firm which is responsible for information processing and communication.
In a recent study [1] , M Beekman developped a management production function to analyse the possible relationships between productivity of workers and size of the managerial organization of the firm as well as to détermine its optimal structure. He treated the output of managers as an intermediate ( product of the firm, the "supervision" or "managerial control** applied to lower levels of management and characterized the structure of the organization with a "span of control" for each level.
In this study a different management production function is proposed, various managerial divisions are allowed at the same level in the organization and the multiproduct case is considered. A discrimination is made between capital for processing informations and communication, which is considered as a common ressource for the managerial divisions, and capital for processing materials, which is allocated to the material processing units.
The Duality Theory of Geometrie Programming is used to analyse the short production planning period with the aim of defining in these conditions the optimal organization of the firm. Special results are derived in the case of a single output firm.
IL THE HÏERARCHICAL PRODUCTION FONCTION
The management of the firm is composed of R administrative levels, r= 1 to R, each level is composed of S (r) divisions, 5=1 to 5 (r) ? with at the top of the management S(R)= L The existence of the management divisions is not discussed here, it is only supposed that each management division has definite and effective functions in the management of the firm.
Each division (r, s) produces a managerial control [1] y rs over divisions of lower level under a supervision of divisions of higher level and with the use of informations provided by the divisions of the next lower ïevel:
where:
is an intermediate input representing "the ability of division (r, 5) in using informations" from other divisions.
x" is the amount of managerial labor in divisions of level r. kj is the amount of capital allocated to information processing in the firm, assumed a common ressource for all the management divisions.
It will be assumed that possible conflicts beetween managerial controls of different higher levels are already taken into account in (1),
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Equations (1) and (2) are associated with hierarchical structures of management control and of information flows such as those displayed in figure 1 and figure 2:
Specifying the fonctions ƒ" and g rs as Cobb-Douglas functions, (1) and (2) become:
(=1 v=X and:
/" = £.x&.fcfK (4) y? s and 1% being constant parameters. The different elasticities in (3) and (4) are supposed non-negative and such that:
ürs -O when division (r, s) is not under direct supervision of division (r+1,0-c? s = 0when information produced by division (r-1, v) is of no direct use for division (r, s).
At the lower level of the firm (material processing), the material outputs are taken as the result of the combination of "effective labor of management" as defined by Beekman [1] , of capital for material processing (kt) and of material inputs. It is assumed in this study that there are no joint products. Using the same Coob-Douglas assumption, the final outputs are such that:
with:
•yo t =yi t *tii-ïlrfu (6) and:
where F,-(Q) is a function of the vector of material inputs Q, and ^8, is a constant parameter. The System of équations (3), (4), (5), (6) being recursive, we get the set of production functions:
i t=i ' where, as in [1] , the presidential labor input is fixed to unity. It must be noted that relation (7) has an enough gênerai form which can be obtained from different hypotheses considering, or not, concepts such as "effective labor of management" or "ability of using informations". It is also possible to allow communication (information exchange) between divisions of the same level without préjudice to the recursivity of the relations defining the managerial controls. Here where there are various divisions in the same level, the concept of span of control as defined in [1] loses its power to characterize the hierarchy.
Dl. EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION OF MANAGEMENT
In the short run analysis the variables considered are the level of operative labor and the level of managerial labor in each divisions. In a first step of the analysis, it is supposed that the level of operative labor in each material processing unit is fixed, so that the variable cost considered is reduced to the cost of management.
A program of production (<??, 4$, ..., q%) of cost C will be said to be efficient if, for the same cost, it is not possible to rise the level of one output i(is{ l 9 
x r5 >0, s= 1 toS (r).
where w rs is the average wage in division s of level r, and where the restrictions ( 10) insure that the corresponding divisions (r, s) are present in the management of the firm, and if [x*] is such that:
and:
then it can be checked easily that the resultîng program of production (q{ 9 qi 9 . -M q{5) of costC([x*]) is efficient in the above sensé for the short run case where the levels of operative labor are fixed. Problem I being convex [2] , its solution is unique. To any efficient program of production ($î, gf, ..,, q%) of feasible costC*, will correspond one organization of management (the solution of Problem I) in the case considered. This organization of management will be qualified as efficient.
If the fonction of the managerial divisions is to insure the existance of production (by taking décisions, fixing objectives, coordinatîng actîvities of lower divisions or processing units,...) without contributing directly to the material process of production. Problem I vanishes since the managerial costs are no more related to the levai of the outputs. Then the structure of management will be determined using alternate considérations to the efficiency of the material production of the firm (see [3] for instance). This situation corresponds to the case in (7) where:
which happens for instance when the elasticities a" of material outputs with respect to direct managerial control are equal to zero. If the firm is not concerned with a significant material processing activity, but instead is concerned with "production" of informations (ou rules, norms, controls, ".) the set of production functions of the firm is such as (assuming that the different outputs are quantifiable and are not joint products):
and &*=0 (14) and (7) can be rewritten as: In this case the notion of efficiency as defined earlier can be useful to détermine the organization of the management of the firm.
Finally* if the outputs of the firm are not quantifiable, the notion of efficiency is no more valid, other considérations must be used to analyse the organization of the firm.
REMARK: For the single output case» the concept of efficiency proposed here reduces to the classical concept of "cost of production'*.
IV. OPTIMAL ASSIGNMENT OF MANAGERIAL COSTS IN THE SHORT RUN-THE MULTI-FRODUCT CASE
In this section we return to the assumptions made in section II to analyse Problem I and to characterise the solution [x*] for the organization of management in the short run. and:
h
/ \fc-i »-i / and:
To this last formulation of Problem I corresponds the Dual Geometrie Program [4] (Problem II):
KJ. * with:
s=l to (r), r=l i=l to JV,
where ,4 is the matrix of the coefficients of the primai variables of Problem I. A is of dimension NXM, where M is the number of managerial divisions in the firm (less the presidencial division):
with f=(pii,..., pk-is(*-ij>.
IMM being the identity matrix of dimension MXM. The degree of difficulty [4] of Problem II is: Thus, if the firm considered has only one output, the degree of difficulty of this probîem is zero, whatever the complexity of the managerial organization of the firm.
In this case, the solution of Problem II is trivial since the feasible set is, when it is not empty, restricted to one point: the solution of the system of équations (22) to (26).
Here also, it can be shown that Problem II is a convex mathematica! programming problem which, when feasible, admits a unique solution. Next, the solution to this problem will be related to the solution of Problem I and its analysis will provide more insight about the properties of an efficient organization of management as defined in section IIL
Duality relations and economie interprétation of Problem II
Since Problems I' and II are a primai geometrie programming problem and its respective dual, their solutions satisfy the following relations:
or: 
r=l s=l or since the elasticities $ s are constant:
Taking into account (34) and (35), the marginal variation of managerial cost can be rewritten as: we have:
R-l S(r) / N v dc = I I ( Z ((8C/8^)-(^/x r5
and: This last expression displays the multiplicative effect of wages and Ievels of production on the cost of production.
The program of production (qf, q$, ..., q$) of cost C* being supposed efficient, relation (11) holds, and we have:
so that:
K-l S(r)
T~T TT jfc e -11 ü X r* or:
R-l S(r)
Defining the "average wage of management" (different from the mean wage) as:
relation (24) implies that:
R-l S (r)
Now, the cost C* can be written as:
&-n n(w.xö< (55)
These last relations lead to the conclusion that the cost assodated with an efficient program of production can be considered as the product of three terms:
-M the aumber of managerial divisions (less the presidential division) ; -Ü* a geometrie mean of the salaries paid in the managerial divisions with a wage equal to the "average wage of management" ; _ e H ( fê*3 ) w jj ere jcjr ( [j: *j ) is a conditional entropy of managerial costs with respect to the repartition of wages between the manageriaî divisions:
From relation (19) we have:
R-1 S (r)
I I> rs =l,
r=l s=l
(o rs can be considered as the a priori probability to spend one unit of the money allocated to the managerial costs, in the (r, s) division (it is supposed that all the managerial divisions are effectively involved in the process of production, that the wages of the managerial divisions are known and that nothing is known about the levels of production of the different outputs). £" can be considered as the probability of the same event, when the program of production is known.
V. OPTIMAL ASSIGNMENT OF MANAGERIAL COSTS BV THE SHORT RUN-THE SINGLE OUTPUT CASE

General considérations
This case is also analysed using the Duality Theory of Geometrie Programming, although it could be treated via the Lagrange Duality Theory, since this tooi allows to deal directly with the management costs of the finn and not with levels of managerial labor which are a conséquence of them in some way. Thus, here:
N=l and D=0.
The restrictions (22) and (24) of Problem II are unchanged while (23) and (25) become (dropping index i):
Solving the system of équations (24)- (25), we get easily:
R-l S(r)
P=E EPr S . (63) r=l s=l
The elasticity of the cost of management with respect to the level of output is a constant, as well as the shares of managerial cost allocated to each division: They depend neither of the level q of the output, nor of the wages w rs of the managerial divisions.
The cost of management becomes:
where the conditional entropy H is now a constant characterising the organization of the management of the firm by providing a measure of the distorsion existing between the share of managerial cost and the relative wage of the managerial divisions: 
R-l S(r)
H
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Thus, when the relative wages of the manageriaî divisions are equal to their relative elasticity of production, the number of managers in each division is constant.
If the îevel of operative labor in the short run is such that;
then:
x* = 1, 5= 1 toS(r), r= i toR-1
Then, the cost of managerial labor (as well as the cost of capital for processing informations) can be considered as a fixed cost (independant of the level of output). This is exactly what happens in the classical theory of the firm where managerial îabor k transparent in the process of production. Nevertheless, hère, the level of operative labor will not be taken in accordance with relation (7Î) but will be determined simultaneously with the levels of managerial labor as a solution of a problem of minimization of the total cost of production in the short run (see section III). This probîem will be investigated in section VI.
With respect to relation (66), it may be worth to note that, since the values p r5 corne from multiplicative as well as additive effects in the organization (see figures 1 and 2), the a> rs are not necessarily decreasing with r. So that» the intuitive feeling that the relative wages are increasing with the corresponding level in the organization, is not damaged by this assumption. Since other means of payment are available for the managers (such as participation to the benefits), even if the wages are chosen according to relation (66) in a decreasing way, the income supplied by the firm to the managers may be an increasing function of their level in the hierarchy.
VL SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS BETWEEN MANAGERIAL AM> OPERATTVE LABOR
In this section managerial costs and operative costs are taken into account simultaneously. The problem of finding an efficient program of production in the short run can be formulated as (Problem III): min with:
x rs >0, s^ 1 toS (r), r= 1 toit-1,
where v t is the average wage in the î-th processing unit. Although the détermination of the levels of operative and managerial labor through the direct use of geometrie programnüng like in Section III leads to a M -1 degree primai geometrie program, in this section we make use of a different strategy of resolution, with the objective of preserving the previous results relative to the internai aspects of the managerial organization. This strategy is based on the observation that Ptoblem III is a separable problem since constraints (75) can be rewritten as: Defining C M :
as the cost of management for levels of output q and of operative labor Problem (80) is convex and its first order conditions of optimality are:
or:
So that 9 at solution, the proportion of operative costs over managerial costs is equal to the proportion of their production elasticities.
If no substitution is permitted and if the wage of the workers is modified, to maintain optimality (a minimum cost of production), a simple rule can be to choose x 0 such that:
If substitutions are aliowed, x 0 must be chosen such that:
Relation (84) implies that x 0 must be modified of a quantity:
While relation (85) implies that x 0 must be modified of a quantity:
fo. (87) Since, | dx% | < | dxl |, the substitution of managerial labor to operative labor leads to a greater stability of the level of the later. Considering relation (80), it can be seen that if the wages of the managerial divisions are modified uniformly by a factor fe, since H is unchanged, the level of the managerial labor will be modified by a factor k {m ** m .
VU. CONCLUSION
The classical theory of the firm has been developped long before the "Computer Révolution" and although the information processing activities of the managerial organisation have always been present» the facilities offered by Electronic Data Processing [7] have been such an important factor of réorganisation of production in the medium and large firms» that a theory of the firm considering explicitly its information processing activities was needed.
The purpose of this study has been to make an attempt to provide such a theory: A simplistic model Connecting the information and material processing activities of the firm has been proposed using Cobb-Douglas functions where the capital allocated to information processing has been taken as a distinct ressource. In this paper the short planning period has been analysed, in f9] this approach is extented to consider the medium planning period problem.
where D and F are definite convex f unctions over W and R* respectively and where S is the feasible set» This problem can be rewritten as [6] : xeE.
Thus, the séparation and subséquent geometrie dualization of the inner prima! program leads to the resolution of a non linear outer problem. No itération between the inner and outer problems is needed, contrarily to what happens with genera! separable problems.
